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(liste at september 1, 2001)

MANAGING PASSION

THE ORGANISATION OF THE RENAULT FORMULA ONE TEAM

by

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June 30th, 2000
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Overview

As a young engineer, passionate about competition and cars, Bruno Mauduit started his career with Renault Sport, where he stayed seventeen years. During this time, he was at the heart of the great adventure of Renault in Formula 1, which culminated in six consecutive World titles. Renault Sport succeeded in achieving this by creating a high-performance and extremely competitive organisation, which combined an almost bureaucratic rigour with an unfailing speed of reaction. The backbones of this organisation were the experts who were passionate about their job, and the wonderful family atmosphere which formed over the years and resulted in a spiral of success.

TALK : Bruno MAUDUIT

I worked for Renault Sport for seventeen years. The last few years witnessed the spectacular adventure of Renault in the Formula 1 circuit, and were marked by six consecutive car constructor World titles and five driver World titles. I would like to tell the story of my career and try to retrace how we worked our way to the top of the ladder.

The Renault Sport adventure

I have always been passionate about two things : firstly, competition, and secondly, cars, mechanics and especially engines. I succeeded in satisfying these two passions at the same time. I had competed at the top level as I was in the French sailing team for two years during the last years of my studies. I liked sailing but what I really loved was the competition that came with it. It got to a point where I was no longer able to steer a boat without going around three buoys and taking on an opponent. In fact, I lost all interest in sailing. When I stopped competing, I could not feel what true sailors feel, like the taste of the sea and the feel for the water. In the same way, my passion for cars and engines led me to carry out studies which allowed me to go to a university specialising in car engineering. I studied at the ENSI in Orléans and I got a degree in engineering and my special interest was “propulsion”.

An uninvited entry into Renault Sport

From that moment onwards, I wanted to combine these two passions of competition and car mechanics in my work. In France, at that time, there were two possibilities : either Renault, which was just starting top-level car racing, or Matra, which conversely, was beginning to wind down its activity having performed well in this field. I made enquiries in both companies, or rather, I forced my way into the organisation : I introduced myself by saying that this was what I wanted to do. I expect they thought I was a bit mad, but I realised afterwards, once they took me on, that all the other candidates did the same. I besieged them for two months, travelling regularly between my home and Viry-Châtillon. In those two months, I worked my way up the ladder, having been received by the security guard, then the switchboard operator, and then a person in charge of the factory, and so on. Having nagged them for such a long time, I met Bernard Dudot, the technical director of Renault Sport, who said that there was perhaps an opportunity for me.

Renault had started putting together the Renault Sport team at Dieppe, concentrating on the Le Mans 24 Hour Race over a key two year programme : one year to make an appraisal and one year to win. In fact, they accomplished this in 1977 and 1978. Additionally, there were several other programmes, such as Formula 2, Formula 3, Junior Team, rallies, and so on. However, in 1979, Gérard Larrousse, managing director of Renault Sport, decided to place all his hopes in Formula 1 and to keep the other programmes on hold. Using the team which already existed and which was moved to Viry-Châtillon, he started to put together a strong team for Formula 1.

Bernard Dudot invited me to join his team in October 1981. At this time, Renault Sport worked on all the parts of the car : there was a “chassis” team which designed and conceived the car, an “engine” team, and a “gear-box” team. I wanted to be in the engine team but Bernard Dudot told me that there was a place in the gear-box team and that the most important thing, if I really wanted to be in Formula 1, was firstly to be in Renault Sport. This was how I started in the small team which worked on the gear-boxes for Renault Formula 1, as well as for the RE 20 and the RE 30. The Renault Sport Formula 1 team at the time consisted of seventy people on the chassis and the gear-box, and about forty on the engine. I worked for just less than a year in the gear-box team before going over to engines.

The turbo challenge

The Renault engine was a 1.5 litre V6. It was a technical challenge which Bernard Dudot had launched, backed by the people from Elf. At that time, the Formula 1 cars were propelled by

client engines, in other words, developed for the car manufacturers by an outside company. Broadly speaking, all the motor racing camps had the same engine, namely a 3 litre standard (atmospheric) engine. However, the rules allowed the use of a 1.5 litre turbo-charger, in other words, one with half the capacity of the standard (atmospheric) engine. Renault took this risk, which seemed a bit mad at the time : a turbo engine was equivalent to a standard (atmospheric) engine but with a capacity 1.4 times greater. Therefore, designing a turbo engine equivalent to twice the capacity of an atmospheric one was, on the face of it, unimaginable. It was, moreover, to discourage the use of the turbo that this ratio of 2 had been imposed.

Renault Sport, nevertheless, launched this technical challenge, largely because it was the only way of convincing Renault management to venture into Formula 1. We were going to produce something new, which would create very good publicity. However, we had to start from scratch, since at this time even the turbo petrol engines on the production models had hardly been developed. Therefore, we were not at all sure how it would perform, and we were in the deep end as far as consumption and reliability were concerned. Nevertheless, the gauntlet had been thrown down.

A little less than a year after I started at Renault Sport, Gérard Larrousse decided to supply engines to a client team for various reasons : firstly, so that more people would talk about Renault ; secondly, to try to make the investment in the engine profitable; and thirdly, as a means to compare us. We had had a number of successes but, in Formula 1, there are so many parts to the equation, that it was very difficult to evaluate simply the performance of the engine with regard to the competition. Providing engines for another team did not change anything in terms of development and even weighed down production, but it allowed us to have more factors at our disposal, in order to analyse our performances. At this time, it was therefore necessary to transfer someone to the client team Lotus, in order to accompany it on the circuit and to serve as the interface with Renault Sport. Bernard Dudot asked me if I wanted to go and I was delighted to accept, since this meant I would be working with engines again and I would be really in the thick of the action.

From this moment, I was in charge of everything to do with Renault in the Lotus camp. This lasted four years, a good period, because in Formula 1 at that time there was a great deal less pressure than today, and the sporting aspect still dominated the business side. The Lotus experience proved to be positive and Gérard Larrousse hoped to repeat it with other teams. In 1984, we started working with Ligier, and, at the end of 1985, with Tyrell. The conception and development took place at Viry-Châtillon. The following-up, in other words, the assembly of the engines and the testing in the cars, was shared between Renault Sport and one of our big subcontractors, Mecachrome. Mecachrome was a machining company, specialising in aeronautics and aerospace. It had done the machining for most of the engine parts, before quickly becoming one of our main partners. It even put the engines in place and tested them on the test bench.

The end of one adventure…

When Georges Besse became director of Renault, the company was not doing very well and he decided to tighten things up. Renault Sport, which represented high expenditure, was put on hold in two stages. At the end of 1985, the chassis and gear-box activities were stopped, leaving just the engines. In 1986, despite the fact that we supplied three camps with engines, Raymond H. Lévy, who succeeded Georges Besse, decided to put the engines also on hold. At the end of 1986, both we and our client teams were told that the Test Team of the V6 engines for Formula 1 was to be stopped. Without knowing future plans, we continued developing the engine until February. At that moment, Patrick Faure, chairman and managing director of Renault Sport and general secretary of Renault, announced that the Renault Formula 1 activities were to be stopped but that Renault wanted to keep the team as it was and would find us something to do. Perhaps Formula 1 would take off again, but on the other hand, perhaps not. Nobody knew anything.

Our team of seventy occupied the entire site at Viry-Châtillon. Renault had given us some work to carry out on the production model engines. Bernard Dudot, our technical director, had succeeded in keeping on most of the team by conveying his optimism and his confidence in a return to Formula 1. Quite quickly, he tried to get together a small amount of money to launch a design programme for a Formula 1 engine. This was the right moment for that since, following the arrival of the Renault turbo engine, its performances had gradually encouraged all the teams to develop this kind of engine. This had influenced the sporting body, faced with the improvement in these performances, to impose once again the use of standard (atmospheric) engines by increasing a little the permitted capacity. This opened the door for the return of Renault. It was, in any case, the argument which Bernard Dudot used to convince the management to allow him to dedicate ten team members exclusively to the design of an engine with its own budget. This was in May 1987, two months after Patrick Faure's announcement that everything was being stopped.

In fact, instead of ten people, Bernard Dudot put the maximum number of people on the project and got enough money to allow us to build three engine prototypes. The parts arrived in January 1988, we assembled the engine, we tested it out and we realised very quickly that it performed well. Bernard Dudot had kept up his contacts with all our former partners and together they had chosen the V10 engine as the best compromise between particular performances and adaptation to an architecture of the high-performing chassis. He succeeded in selling the project to Renault, insisting that we were the first to build a V10 and that we would be as successful with the turbo engine. From then on, everything happened very quickly. In May 1989, Renault signed a partnership deal with Williams. We rapidly finished the projects that we were working on for Renault and started again on Formula 1.

…and the beginning of the next

The entire team was back on the road and a decision was made to restructure and to strengthen our team. A fair number of people were hired and we set off again. However, this time we were playing for high stakes in Formula 1 as far as our turbo engine was concerned. This time we were coming back to win. We had won twenty races with the turbo engine, and we had just missed winning the World championship in 1983. This time, Renault was back in Formula 1 in order to win the World championship. Moreover, we were working with Williams which was already one of the best teams at the time and which had just won the championship.

The organisation of the team

We increased in size quite quickly : between the return to Formula 1 and the championship World titles, we grew from seventy to two hundred people. The formal hierarchy was nothing out of the ordinary : it was in pyramid form, with a predominantly technical management which had been established quite naturally when we numbered just forty, and which we had never questioned since, despite our change in scale. In practical terms, the driving force behind Renault Sport was the technical director Bernard Dudot, who was in charge of all the technical side. He answered to the chairman and managing director, Patrick Faure, who, as managing director, was responsible for all the administrative departments. Under the technical director, there was one person in charge of the R & D, Jean-Jacques His, and one person in charge of production, Jean-François Robin. Each of them was responsible for several other departments : His was in charge of the design department, tests, and electronics; Robin was responsible for the Race Team, purchases, machining, assembly shop and the control department. It goes without saying, that all these people had strong personalities, were experts in their fields, and were passionate about motor sports.

A winning organisation

In our first year, 1989, we had some results which were almost heaven-sent, finishing in second place in the World championships after two Grand Prix victories. At the end of 1990, after a year where we fell to fourth place which was frankly more representative of our true ranking, we decided with Williams that we take the steps necessary in order to win. The

stakes are not necessarily the same for a camp, like Williams, as for a manufacturer like Renault.

The car manufacturer pays to be represented : he chooses a partner, supplies engines and provides additional money to profit from possible consequences of media coverage. On the other hand, a camp has to earn money. However, it does not have to finish in first place to be profitable. Williams was very happy to finish among the first three, whereas for Renault, this was not acceptable : they had to be first. Williams understood and agreed to play the game and to make every effort to help us win. We therefore had to rethink everything in order to analyse properly what needed to be corrected.

We identified that the entire production and racing side was very strong because we had put people there who were truly passionate about production and racing. I was one of them : these were people who wanted to be there to touch the car, to smell the petrol, and so on ; they were real race experts. In the R & D department, they were engine experts, people who took real pleasure in designing beautiful parts but who, in a simplified representation, did not necessarily have a clear picture of what the finished model would look like. Therefore, we decided to shift some of the passion for and experience of racing towards the R & D department. In practical terms, we put into place a communication system, such that everyone knew at all times what was happening elsewhere in their department. Several people in production, including me, were asked to transfer our knowledge of racing to the design department. In addition, we established targets so that everyone had to meet regular deadlines up until the race date. The aim was that the racing deadlines, well known by the production team, should also be well known in the R & D department. Clearly, we could not possibly have a half-assembled engine or an engine which had not been completely tuned on the starting line. In summary, we completely restructured the organisation to suit the racing deadlines.

Working in rhythm with the race

A race had to be prepared as soon as the previous race had finished. In the half-day which followed our return to Viry-Châtillon, there was a debriefing meeting with all those who had taken part in the race : not only those who were at the track-side, but also a member from the machining department, another from the technical adjustment side, someone from design and those in charge of each development department. We went through what had worked well, and what had not. We worked out the solutions to be implemented and appointed the people to work on these solutions. The same evening, this was all written up in a report. During the Grand Prix, on the Thursday[1] preceding the race we had a feedback after each test session. Immediately following the meeting, the Race Team made a report containing all the positive and negative points and the actions which needed to be taken. The information was distributed to everyone. This was the routine, every day, up until Sunday noon before the start of the race.

In the same way, the test engineers, who were in charge of the tuning both on the test bench at Viry-Châtillon and at the track-side, communicated all their results. In advance, they transmitted the objective and the programme of the test ; during the test, they were in contact with the people directly concerned. Afterwards, they analysed the results, drew up a report and distributed it instantly. There was also a weekly report of all the tests which had been carried out during the week. In addition, every Thursday, there was a development meeting in which everyone took part and during which we took stock of all the R & D projects in the short or long term. These meetings proceeded in a very democratic way : there were no superiors or subordinates and everyone was on an equal footing.

[1] The Grand Prix races take place on Sundays, with roughly a two week interval, each time in a different country. For the teams involved, the Grand Prix begins on the Thursday with the preparation of the cars, and of our plant. Then on the Friday and Saturday, the trials and qualification sessions take place. The qualifications are timed trial sessions which determine the positions on the starting grid, in other words, the starting order of the cars.

A family atmosphere

There was a very important relationship of trust between everyone. I think that this was one of the keys to its success. From the moment that Bernard Dudot appointed someone to a certain job, he trusted him totally. When, at these meetings, the specialist in the particular field gave his opinion, it was taken into account. There was a real family atmosphere in the team and it was this which gave it its strength. All those who joined Renault Sport stayed. Everyone knew the qualities and faults of everyone else very well, and each person was therefore used to the best of his abilities. I think that this knowledge we had of each other was essential in the success of the team.

COMMENTS : Christophe MIDLER

I studied Renault Sport in 1996, following the request by the management of the mechanical department at Renault which was interested in the issue of the transfer of experience. Renault Sport was at its peak and those in charge of the mechanics side wondered if there was not anything to be learnt which could be passed on to the production line engines, not in terms of production but as far as development and design were concerned.

Analysing the performance

I began by trying to assess the distinctive features of this organisation with regard to its performance : what does “being a good team” mean ? I can summarise the characteristics I found from two points of view : firstly, I was struck by the fact that performance in this setting is a learning curve. Nothing can be taken for granted : if one is good at one race and one remains stable, one might be bad in the following race ! Performance is not about being good, but about constantly improving. Secondly, in this setting there is a sort of mix of complexity and simplicity. The profession of car racing is simple for two main reasons. On the one hand, one does not have to question one’s motivation : there is no laziness. On the other hand, the appraisal of the work of the team is objective and unquestionable since it is put to the test during the race every other Sunday. Faced with these factors of simplicity, there are factors of complexity which are just as important. The first is the overlap of different levels of deadlines and time-scales : one works both on Sunday’s race and on the development of new engines for the following seasons, and so on. The second is the multiplicity of components which enter into the performance equation : the power of the engine, the aerodynamics of the chassis, the quality of the driver, and so on. Performance is a compromise between components which are very different in their natural state, but which need to be united.

The paradox of speed and rigour

I then observed Renault Sport more closely, and I was struck by the fact that its organisation and its performance - such as I had characterised it - seemed paradoxical with regard to management theories. It was an organisation which showed both a very great speed of reaction and a very great rigour. They were constantly making changes, but maintained meticulous tracking. All the parts which existed at Renault Sport were numbered and one knew where to find them at any one time. This made one think of a very formal organisation but it was a formality of unfailing reaction, capable of changing in an instant ! This organisation managed to reconcile short-term responses with the transfer of knowledge, the development of technologies and a response to clients’ needs.

In order to explain this paradoxical method of working, I will highlight three internal and two external characteristics. As far as the internal characteristics are concerned, there was firstly an organisational compactness in decision-taking. There was no interface to manage conflicts between the different departments ; in each department, one expert took on the responsibilities on a short, medium and long term basis. Communication naturally became very fast due to this tight structure, and each person’s responsibilities to make the group efficient were

obvious. Secondly, it seems to me that the continuity of the organisation played an essential role : there was a group competence which was implicit, as people had been there for a long time and knew each other. Thirdly, and this really struck me as I had imagined that this activity was rolling in money, I felt that there was a strong preoccupation to achieve economic efficiency, not geared towards a reduction in costs but towards the creation of value. They knew that they had a set budget and that they could not change it. They really thought hard to make the most of the budget they were given.

Among the external characteristics of team performance which seemed very important to me were the organisation of a very close relationship with the client and the users of the engines (those in charge of the team or the drivers themselves) on the one hand, and the autonomy and the lack of transparency in Renault's working arrangement on the other within the framework of a contract based on performance. Moreover, stopping the research, after an initial phase of investigation, was the result of this autonomy. The problem of the transfer of design skills had not been directed to team issues and could even present a risk in a world where everyone is on the lookout for the everyone else's secrets.

DISCUSSION

A wonderful period

Question : *Despite the success which followed, you seem to remember particularly the first period of your experience, when you said the sporting aspect dominated …*

Bruno Mauduit : In the mid 1980s, the regulations allowed a great deal more freedom than they do today. For example, as far as the qualification sessions were concerned, almost everything was allowed, which gave rise to real battle scenes. We pulled out all the stops so that the driver made the best time possible for a lap : we lowered the car a bit, we "loaded" it[2], we put on very soft tyres which only lasted one lap, and we greatly raised the boosting pressure of the engines in order to increase their power, and so on. Often the car used in the qualification sessions was not the same car that was used in the race. It was a very exciting game for everyone. For the drivers, there was an atmosphere of little quarrels and slight deviations from the spirit of the sport. During the qualifying laps, a driver could go onto the track even with bad tyres, simply to slow down an opponent or to put his team-mate, who was not sufficiently well placed on the grid, in his tow [3], in order to help his chances of a better starting position.

For us engine builders, it was really a pleasure because we had all the freedom in the world to create high-performance engines in their pure state. We played with the reliability limits and the performance of the engine. We still had very few control tools, unlike today, when there is telemetry and all the data taken onboard. We had two or three elements for monitoring the car on the dashboard – a rev-counter, a pressure gauge controlling the boosting pressure and indicators for the temperature of the oil, the water and the exhaust fumes. We told the driver to look at them, to comply with certain orders and to give us a full report when he stopped. Conversations with him were therefore very important. Moreover, at Renault, we had one of the best engines for use in the qualification sessions, which enabled us to be on the front line of the starting grid very often. In this exercise, we were very strong but during the race, we had less good performances.

[2] To load a car, in racing jargon, means to put in more aerodynamic down-force : this changes its finesse, gets drag, and generates down-force. This decreases its top speed but enables a greater speed when coming out of bends and, in the end, makes for a faster lap.

[3] The effects of tow in motor racing play a fundamental role. A car which is well placed in front of another in a straight line allows the one behind to gain a few more kilometres/hour.

The driver : a team member

Q. : *What sort of relations did you have with your drivers ?*

B. M. : For the people who were directly in contact with them, the relationship was very privileged. At this time when there was no telemetry, working closely with the driver was absolutely essential since it was the driver who reported back the little amount of information which existed. Outside of these "technical" relationships, very important relationships developed on a psychological level, as did a strong sense of trust. Once the driver got into his cockpit, his only outside contact was with the engineer in charge of his car and the engineer in charge of his engine.

Q. : *But you were on totally different levels of reasoning* : *you were part of a team, whereas the driver was more of an individual and a bit of a brat…*

B. M. : Yes. We tried to make him understand the team's contribution, from all points of view. We tried to give him the confidence he needed. We constantly told him what we were doing, and showed him why we were doing it.

However, not all of them were individualists. Some of them were very interested in the workings of the system in general : their engine, their car, their team, and so on. It depended on the personality of the driver. Ayrton Senna, for example, was only interested in the result : he had to be first ! If he was not, he gave us hell. Even when he was first, he would still give us an earful : once, when he tried for pole position[4], which was technically out of his reach, he got out of his car and said : " *It wasn't you who made pole position today, it was me. I made it by taking risks which I normally don't take !* "

We also had drivers who gave us no help at all on the technical side. Nigel Mansell did not know how to do anything other than drive and was incapable of following orders or helping us do the tuning. It was because of him, or thanks to him, that we improved. We realised that we could not do the tuning with him and so we developed our system of data acquisition and on board expertise so that we no longer needed the driver in order to put the finishing touches to the car and the equipment.

Managing passion

Q. : *You said that there was no problem about team motivation, but you still had to sustain it. How did you manage that, in financial terms and in terms of recognition ?*

B. M. : In the beginning, the people who wanted to work at Renault Sport were passionate about cars, and they understood very quickly that the results achieved were those of the whole team. Consequently, the motivation was largely self-maintained, by the fact that one belonged to a team and by the deadlines imposed by the Grand Prix. However, it is true that one also had to sustain it a little, notably in financial terms, because we demanded a great deal of availability and energy : when there was a test in progress or a problem to solve, you had to be there.

There was no formal recognition of individual work : all the bonuses were collective. For the people who were in the spotlight, the recognition was obvious but it could have some strange effects. I was in this situation at the beginning. For ten years, on the Sunday of the race, I was the one who was at the track. Viewed from the outside, I ended up representing Renault Sport as far as the media was concerned. There was a risk that this sort of thing went to your head. Moreover, for several people who worked for Renault Sport, it did…

As far as the others were concerned, I think that each person was conscious of what he brought to the team and derived his own personal satisfaction. In any case, his work was recognised by the people with whom he worked.

Christophe Midler : The problem in this field is not so much to sustain the motivation but to know how to channel it. These people who are passionate about racing have to agree to do certain precise, nit-picking things, and to observe the formalities and the rules, in which they

[4] *Pole position* is the first place on the starting grid.

not only have to enjoy trying things out but also have to make meticulous reports, and so on. The risk is having an activity which works on energy and not at all on efficiency. The success of this organisation was not in knowing how to motivate one's team but how to preserve its reasonable functioning with people who were motivated in any case. We come across the same sort of problem in Internet start-ups, for example.

B. M. : It is true that we had to channel this passion in order to prevent it disrupting the system. One day, even though I had already left the previous evening at ten o'clock, I learnt that the test had been carried out at four o'clock in the morning. I kicked up a fuss but the guys did not understand immediately. They ran the risk of disrupting everything because the constant contact which we had established with the whole group was lost : they had done something without the group being involved. Not all the people involved with this test were there, and so the analysis and the distribution of the results could not be done instantly. You had to make sure that people took time to rest. If we had not been careful, a lorry driver, transporting the engines to the race tracks, could have been driving for twenty-four hours without a break.

A compromise between bureaucratic rules and creative passion

Q. : *Did you have rules in order to avoid these kinds of events ?*

B. M. : No, we avoided having to resort to rules ; we behaved in such a way that each person was responsible for constantly analysing what he had to do and what he should not do. From 1997 onwards, there have been a plethora of rules and that gets on everyone's nerves ! We have always done things which bordered on the illegal : we used hired cars on the circuits, we raced them, and so on. This sort of thing is not really allowed but it cannot be banned. The minute you put out a memo saying that this sort of thing is really banned, you kill the passion. Bernard Dudot said to me, while watching the guys race on the track : " *It's great ! I get the impression that your guys have always got two bags of marbles in their pockets and they are playing in the playground…*" Obviously, from time to time, we had to hold them back, but we also had to make the most of this energy and certainly not hand out too many rules.

Q. : *Nonetheless, there were implicit rules about behaviour in their work, for example, about the way in which a test was conducted…*

B. M. : It was more a case of knowledge, which had not been dictated by a boss but which had been chosen in a democratic way, gradually, depending on the problems which we encountered.

C. M. : I think that this type of organisation also worked because it was in a spiral of success. The fact that the team had good results validated the legitimacy of these internal game rules and allowed the passion to continue to run a sufficiently free rein. It was a sort of virtuous circle. In a team which was less successful, I think that the compromise between meticulous adherence to the rules and creative passion would tend to veer towards the side of muddled improvisation and be generally less efficient.

Spreading the word ?

Q. : *Today, you no longer work for Renault Sport. Why did you not continue to work for Renault to "spread the word" ?*

B. M. : When we stopped at the end of 1997, Bernard Dudot left after twenty years with Renault Sport. He left thinking that he would be close to retirement if Renault made up its mind one day to start Formula 1 all over again. Therefore, he preferred to continue doing Formula 1 elsewhere. Jean-Jacques His was asked to work for Renault. Jean-François Robin was asked to take early retirement and from that moment onwards, all the team fell apart. As for me, I did not agree with the management and in these circumstances, working for Renault, would have been equivalent to being blacklisted right from the start. I did not even try to get a job. In the end, I completely turned my back on Formula 1 because I would never have found

the same thing again elsewhere. I do not know in detail the organisation of the other teams, but, from what I do know, none of them works in the way in which we used to work.

Today I work for an engineering company where I develop the division concerned with cars. It is a lot less technical than what I did before ; it resembles much more the management of a small to medium-sized enterprise. I wanted to gain experience in managing a company before returning to the “sport and show business industry”.

Presentation of the speakers

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Distribution : September 2000