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CORRUPTION AND WEAKNESS OF WILL

by

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Overview

In the framework of his thesis the central part of which was the interrelationship of cognitive science, philosophy and social psychology, Alain Anquetil analysed a series of accounts of people who had been implicated in instances of corruption in the workplace. Having demonstrated *weakness of will* (Aristotle's *akrasia*), in other words, having intentionally carried out an action contrary to their better judgment, these individuals went through a *rumination* phase which resulted in them taking radically opposing action, often resulting in resignation. This paradoxical process may be interpreted as a « flaw in rationality », or as the result of a dilemma between contradictory values. It can also often be explained by the considerable isolation felt by those who are faced with difficult decisions.

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TALK : Alain ANQUETIL

This talk is based on my thesis about the weakness of will of executives in situations which pose ethical dilemmas. I carried out a field study which was deliberately based on unstructured interviews with nineteen executives who had worked in environments where there was corruption.

Acratic action

What these executives had in common is that they all carried out *acratic* action. This term derives from the Greek word *akratos* which means "absence of a certain type of power". Acratic action, which I will refer to as A, is an action which conveys weakness of will to oppose corruption. The consequence of this action is that these people end up unfortunately participating in this situation of corruption.

To be acratic, action has to be intentional, freely carried out, and contrary to the better judgment of the person who carries it out. This better judgment would ordinarily have resulted in a different and alternative action, which I will call B.

Acratic action is followed by a 'rumination period', characterised by a psychological process which psychologists Léonard Martin and Abraham Tesser (1989) define as follows : there is a conscious thought directed towards a given object over a long period of time. The thought is unintentional and comes to mind unexpectedly. This thought is obsessional and is generally automatic and uncontrolled. It can sometimes be brought to mind by the person himself, who can revive it deliberately. This process is a kind of search which goes on until the person finds a solution to the problem. Rumination generally ends once the objective, which was thwarted by action A, has been achieved.

This period, which is relatively unpleasant in some respects, ends with the subject carrying out the *counter-acratic* action A^* . This alternative action, which wrong foots the first (A), allows the person to extract himself from the situation of corruption.

I will now illustrate this process with the help of four case studies which I think are particularly striking.

The case of Mr. S

Mr. S has a friend who is the majority shareholder in a group. The friend offers Mr. S a position in the group. Three months later, he offers Mr. S the presidency of an important subsidiary which represents 50 % of the group's activity. The former chairman and managing director of this subsidiary, who is a minority shareholder, becomes sales manager, but still retains his shares.

Soon after taking up his position in the subsidiary, Mr. S discovers widespread embezzlement in the form of fraudulent dealings with the company's assets. Cash was being distributed between the minority shareholders of the group, not only at the subsidiary level but also at the group level. Companies who were in collusion established service contracts which were purely a means of embezzling money. Mr. S attempts to oppose these practices but without success.

One day, while the subsidiary he manages is experiencing difficulties with the bank, Mr. S discovers that the sales manager has committed another fraud and that the cash till is empty. Instead of making known this misdemeanour, Mr. S decides to refund the amount from his own personal account and transfers it to the company account so that the subsidiary can honour its commitment to the bank.

Following this episode, and without anyone asking him to do so and purely out of friendship to the majority shareholder who gave him this job, Mr. S decides to draw up a recovery plan for the group. In so doing, he uncovers financial difficulties even more serious than he could have imagined.

Mr. S tries hard to convince his friend that it would be best to liquidate the whole group voluntarily at once, a move which would enable them to start afresh ; but without success.

Mr. S considers two options : either he stays and liquidates the subsidiary which, as manager he has the power to do; or he resigns. He decides on the latter and consequently officially summons the shareholders sending his notice in writing, and resigning both as an employee and as chairman and managing director of the subsidiary. He justifies his resignation as a means of protecting himself against any future implications.

The case of Mr. R

Mr. R works in a department which is in danger of closing. The director of a neighbouring department suggests that he should come to work with him. Mr. R feels an obligation of loyalty to his superiors and refuses to « leave the sinking ship ». The director of the neighbouring department tells him that if his department disappears, which he thinks is inevitable, that he can always join his.

A year later, this turns out to be the case : Mr. R's department ceases to exist. The director of the neighbouring department keeps his word, offers him a job once more, and this time Mr. R accepts.

The minute he arrives, Mr. R discovers a situation of generalised corruption at all levels. He realises that the reason he was taken on, is because this company is answerable to its supervisory board, and that Mr. R is known for his ability to prepare files which present a positive picture. He decides to refuse to use the same methods as his colleagues and continues to implement honest methods.

Three years later, the director of the department offers him a promotion. Mr. R hesitates but finally accepts. He knows that his colleagues are corrupt, but thinks that it must be possible to coexist if each person keeps to his own methods. Additionally, since he is known for his refusal to take part in corrupt dealings, he thinks that his decision to accept this promotion could not be construed as accepting a bribe nor participating in the corruption.

Several months later, the director offers him a part in the profit-share scheme without any apparent strings attached. This time, Mr. R refuses categorically since he reckons that he is sufficiently well paid and that there is no justification for being paid more : « *I have a salary ; I think it is representative of my worth and I don't need any more.* »

From this moment on, his position in the company becomes untenable and he finds himself in conflict with the director of the department and his circle. Six months later, he is almost forcibly made redundant : the director summons him into his office and orders him to sign his redundancy letter.

The case of Mrs. 17

The third case concerns Mrs. 17, so called because she was the seventeenth interviewee.

Mrs. 17 is recruited by a bank. Shortly after her recruitment, the bank experiences major difficulties and has to undergo a widespread restructuring operation. Two of Mrs. 17's superiors, her immediate boss and her boss's boss, are laid off and the number of employees drops from two hundred to thirty. Her team, following this layoff, finds itself with nobody in charge until the moment that a new managing director is appointed. According to Mrs. 17,

this managing director does not know anything about running a bank but he has a degree of charisma and shares the same values as Mrs. 17.

Three months after his arrival, the managing director offers her an important promotion. She is offered the position of number one in the business where she had hitherto been number three. She accepts. Later, she admits « *If I had not been naïve and inexperienced, I would not have accepted such a promotion so quickly. I would have demanded that an internal audit be carried out and I would have cleared a certain number of things with my boss.* »

Unfortunately, while taking up her new position, she discovers that her former superiors have been embezzling investment securities.

An external auditor, appointed by the parent company, puts pressure on the bank to obey the law and to put the assets in line with current market value. However, this action would result in the bank going bankrupt. Therefore, Mrs. 17 decides to follow the managing director's strategy of going with the flow and advancing towards progressive streamlining. The external auditor formally informs the bank of its legal obligations and suggests disciplinary sanctions against the managing director and Mrs. 17.

Mrs. 17 discovers that the managing director, whom she had greatly admired and befriended, gave false evidence against her. Notably, he claimed that it was Mrs. 17 who had taken the initiative in certain share transfers, that he was not a specialist in this area and that she had betrayed his trust.

In a panic, Mrs. 17 calls her lawyer. He does not have much time to look into the case which lacks many essential features. « *It was at this moment that I became aware of my lack of experience : many things had been decided verbally and had not been put down in writing »* she said later. Mrs. 17 is summoned by the managing director and is pressurised not to answer certain questions, but this time she refuses. Finally, she is made redundant without financial penalties, whereas the managing director is made redundant and has to pay penalties.

The case of Mr. T

The case of Mr. T is an opposite example because he did not carry out any acratic action. He works in a civil engineering company and is contacted by an intermediary whose client offers him an important market (10 % of the company's turnover) provided he receives a commission. Mr. T weighs up all the likely risks in this corrupt situation while being aware that there will be reprisals from the client if he refuses.

Fortunately, he and his chairman and managing director trust each other. Mr. T contacts him and the chairman gives him the following instructions : he should act as if he agrees to the operation, but then manage to fix such a high price that it will be impossible to win this market. This agreement with the chairman and managing director has to be kept secret. In fact, it is not easy to put this scheme into practice since it seems odd that the price is so high. Mr. T is pressurised within the company to lower the price to win the tender. Once again, he contacts the chairman and managing director to confirm his instructions and maintains the price. The tender is lost.

Two sets of values

In these examples, the contradiction between the actions A and A^* can be explained by the fact that they relate to two sets of values.

In this respect, the case of Mr. S is an example, because during the interview, he clearly describes the two sets of values, one of which he associates with action A and one with action A^* . Action A is based on values such as professional success, items in the company's interest, respect for what the principal shareholder wants, and his friendship with Mr. S. Action A^* is based on values such as respect for the law, the role of the company representative, and also the personal security of Mr. S and his family.

In the case of Mrs. 17, there are also two sets of values. On the one hand there is a set of values which encouraged Mrs. 17 to accept her promotion, notably the friendship she felt for her managing director and which she had thought was mutual. On the other hand there is a set of values which would ordinarily have meant that Mrs. 17 would have laid down certain conditions before accepting her promotion, such as her judgment that she was not necessarily qualified for a position which was two grades higher than her original job, particularly during a period of restructuring. She should have been more careful both regarding herself and her family.

The role of rumination

According to the philosophers Philip Pettit and Michael Smith (1993), the decision to choose action A can be explained by a flaw between the judgment made and the desire to implement the action which corresponds to this judgment. The choice of the 'wrong' option can be explained by the fact that *all* the values have not been correctly weighed up at the time when the person involved deliberates.

In a way, rumination makes up for the shortcoming of this period of deliberation. In the case of Mr. S, his spontaneous reaction when he discovered the important level of fraud committed by the managing director was to advance the money to avoid an overdraft. During rumination, he realises that his behaviour leads him to endorse the situation rather than to rectify it. This prompts him to think of his goals and to ask himself whether all this is consistent with his original objectives. Finally, rumination leads him to the decision he should have taken immediately, had he completed his deliberation.

The effect of rumination is even more spectacular with Mr. R who for months on end agreed to accept a specific situation, and then suddenly took a decision which was totally contrary to his usual behaviour and which came as a great surprise to the director of his department.

The syllogism of akrasia

For the philosophers Philip Pettit and Michael Smith, rational action assumes combining judgment and desire. If there is a discrepancy between the two, then action is irrational.

The role of desire in the genesis of acratic action is emphasised by Aristotle. He takes the example of a person who is looking at something pleasant, for example an appetising cake, and he explains his acratic action by the fact that the action was faced with a double syllogism. The first syllogism, S1, has the main premise *« one should steer clear of things which are pleasant as they are bad for one's health »*; the second, S2, has the main premise *« things which are pleasant are agreable »*. The minor premise of S1 and S2 is the same, namely *« this is pleasant »*. According to Aristotle, if the person had a clear perception of the situation, his judgment would lead him to follow S1 and therefore to refrain from eating the cake. However, his judgment is confounded by the desire expressed in the assessment *« this is pleasant »*, with the result that he follows S2 and eats the cake.

An aura of rationality

Intuitively, action A seems irrational. However, one may consider another approach and imagine that action A* is somehow contained within action A. When Mr. S does not make known his sales manager's misdemeanour, one may suppose that this action is an indirect way of preparing his subsequent action, namely his resignation. Action A may seem irrational with

regards to the values of the person, but it has the advantage of an aura of rationality inasmuch as it constitutes the starting point in the process which will enable the person to find a way out of this impossible situation and in keeping with his values. In any case, the process from A to A^* is rational since it is aimed at restoring coherence between the person and his values.

The man who brushes his teeth

In a famous article, which appeared in 1970, the American philosopher Donald Davidson brought back into fashion the concept of the weakness of the will. This has since become the subject of a great deal of literature. This text presents the story of *The man who brushes his teeth* and suggests an interpretation a little different from that of the irrationality of acratic action : « I have just relaxed in bed after a hard day when it occurs to me that I have not brushed my teeth. Concern for my health bids me rise and brush; sensual indulgence suggests I forget my teeth for once. I weight the alternatives in the light of the reasons; on the one hand my teeth are strong, and at my age decay is slow. It won't matter much if I don't brush them. On the other hand, if I get up, it will spoil my calm and may result in a bad night's sleep. Everything considered I judge that I would do better to stay in bed. Yet my feeling that I ought to brush my teeth is too strong for me: wearily I leave my bed and brush my teeth. My act is clearly intentional, although against my better judgment, and so is acratic. » (Davidson 1970, p30)

For Donald Davidson, acratic action is a failing in rationality, not because there is a lack of connection between judgment and desire, but because judgment has not included all the pertinent reasons which should have been examined. Everything happens as if an unconventional reason managed to escape from all the reasons considered in the judgment, and prevailed in spite of this. In this case, the unconventional reason is the concern which the man in the story has for his health.

This example was discussed by a great number of people including the philosopher Jon Elster (1999). He thought that the reason why the man got up to brush his teeth was that he had a golden rule that he would brush his teeth every night, and if he were not to get out of bed, then that would create a precedent which would make it more difficult for him to keep to this rule in the future. In these circumstances, it is not a case of a reason which escaped from the rest of the reasons given in the beginning, but of an external reason, a new reason which intervenes after the judgment. Therefore, it cannot be considered as an acratic action, since the action is based on a radically new judgment.

Émilie's doctorate

According to another more recent analysis, it may be that acratic action is most consistent with all the reasons specific to the person concerned. Take the example of Émilie, a PhD student whose objective is to continue her doctorate. However, she feels dissatisfied by her studies and decides to interrupt them unexpectedly. The author of this example, Nomy Arpaly (2000), suggests that the action of giving up her doctorate is contrary to Émilie's better judgment, but it is not irrational since when Émilie made her judgment, she was not aware of certain other reasons which appeared after the moment when she took the decision to act contrary to this judgment.

Another virtuous effort !

In conclusion, we may ask ourselves the following question : « These different people have shown at the end of their stories that they were virtuous. But why was their virtue not strong enough to prevent them committing acratic action A rather than directing them to carry out action A* immediately ? ». Perhaps these people were not 'careful' enough, in Aristotle's use of this word : in other words, in the sense of their capacity to decide what is good and advantageous for themselves. Perhaps they found themselves in a situation where they felt isolated and this prevented them from being able to solve their dilemma by themselves. The counter-example of Mr. T who had the advantage of the support of his chairman and

managing director is significant here, and one may imagine that ethical committees, which exist in some companies, play a crucial role in this respect. Finally, perhaps these people possessed a quality which allows them to form a correct judgment, but not executive qualities which are, for example, linked to self control and which allow one to go beyond judgment and lead to action.

DISCUSSION

The psycho-social dimension

Question : It seems to me that the psychological dimension is missing in the example of the man who brushes his teeth. If the man stays in bed, his dissatisfaction at not having cleaned his teeth will prevent him from sleeping. Eventually, it is this which causes him to get up. For me, the Aristotlean approach can only be a starting point, not an end point. It is an approach which is a bit too rational and which sometimes ignores the "inhabited" aspect of human behaviour.

Another element of psychology, which is well highlighted by transactional analysis, is the quite simplistic psychological process which encourages someone to want to play the role of saviour, a process which is well illustrated by the case of Mr. S.

The psychological dimension is also present in the way in which some characters cling to friendships they have with their superiors to an almost absurd degree. This is called the gel effect, the way we often have of sticking to our decisions, or what we claim to be our decisions. Many absurd decisions, such as those described by Christian Morel in his book Les décisions absurdes¹, can be interpreted in the light of this phenomenon of psychosociology. I should also mention the abscons trap into which many people seem to have fallen. Take the following example : you are half an hour from your house by foot and you decide to take the bus home. You wait for the bus for a quarter of an hour but it has still not arrived. On the one hand, you know that in theory the next bus should come by in twenty minutes, but you are tired of waiting while on the other hand, having already waited so long, you do not want to go home on foot. Once you have entered into this sort of reasoning, you can keep going indefinitely, unless you decide once and for all to end it then and there by taking a particular action.

Finally, we could interpret Mr. R's behaviour in the light of what some sociologists studying the workplace call the logic of the action of the employee in the company. There are three such logics : to integrate ; to lead a personal career which implies competing with certain colleagues ; and living out a personal project. A compromise has to be reached with these three contradictory logics every time, a fact which creates variable configurations. I think that this sort of approach would be likely to enrich the vision you represent which is perhaps a bit too simplistic.

Business ethics

Q.: As far as I am concerned, I think you are perfectly legitimate in your disciplinary choice of favouring a philosophical approach. One could argue that your analyses are false or incomplete, but at least they have the advantage of prompting a great number of questions. However, I have an internal criticism : you say, in conclusion, that these people were not sufficiently careful in the sense that they did not understand sufficiently the situation in which they found themselves. Therefore, it is more a case of a flaw in their level of intelligence than of their moral code. One could equally criticise you on the same grounds : your analysis does not take into account sufficiently the situation in which these people find themselves, in other words, the world of business which functions according to its own morality.

¹ Christian Morel, *Les décisions absurdes - Sociologie des erreurs radicales et persistantes*, Gallimard, 2002 et Christian Morel, *Les décisions absurdes*, Les Annales de l'École de Paris, vol VIII.

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In answer to the question « What morality should one adopt in a tough world where there is no central authority ? », Axelrod, in his book The evolution of cooperation (1984) gives the following very simple reply : the least bad morality in this situation is the lex talionis, 'an eye for an eye', in other words, a two-tier morality in which one is very kind to one's friends but merciless with one's enemies. When one wants to succeed in business, one has to enlist all the friends necessary to launch one's company and to do this, one has to catch each person where he is most vulnerable to make him interested in the situation. When your friend becomes unprofitable and when his contribution to the future progress of the business is no longer adequate, he simply has to be eliminated in order to protect the whole system. Taking into account this basic functioning which is also highlighted by the example of the prisoner's dilemma, would have led you to describe a form of morality which is a little scathing with regards to the idea of virtue in the normal sense of the word, but would have led you to put forward ideas of corruption and weakness of will in a very different light.

Alain Anquetil : Mr. S and Mr. R appear exactly to have been unable to implement the *tit for tat* strategy. The player adopting this strategy starts by cooperating but the next time, if the other person cooperates, he cooperates and if the other person backs out, he also backs out. However, Mr. S and Mr. R continue to cooperate for a time, even if they think if is preferable to back out.

The idea of weakness of will allows us not only to describe this type of situation, but also to analyse the role of the values at stake. Each of the values to which Mr. S subscribes possesses a motivational content and involves demands which are likely to guide the action, but the relationship between these demands and the available options (filing for bankruptcy, resigning, or even staying and doing nothing) was partly uncertain. For example, values of security and protection of one's family pointed Mr. S towards the choice of either filing for bankruptcy or for resigning.

Mr. S could not solve his moral conflict by eliminating or strengthening one of his values, or by looking for a value which allowed comparison or even by acccepting a general principle. He thought seriously about it, helped by outside advice. It is his judgment which played an essential role faced with a situation which was new and which therefore prevented the possibility of simply referring to a principle or resorting to some sort of golden rule which had already been tried and tested between opposing values.

Against "ethno-moral" relativism

Q.: When one travels around the world, one realises that it is not corruption which is the exception, but honesty. Corruption is part of a normal way of working in a number of countries, but when a manager is suddenly overcome with a moral frenzy and tries to hang or emprison people who carry out their job in the way that they think is normal, then things become complicated. Often, this practice can be explained very simply : in many countries, civil servants are not necessarily guaranteed the dignity and the security which should be attached to their status, since frequently they are simply not paid. Their only solution is to get rich by misappropriating public funds ; if they do not do this, then they are regarded as being stupid and they put their families in financial danger. This sort of dilemma is difficult to reduce to a simple opposition between good and evil or truth and lies. I should add that honesty or corruption depends a great deal more on the context in which it exists rather than on personal convictions. When Hong Kong was still a British colony, British civil servants, who back home in Britain were strictly incorruptible, committed unbridled acts of corruption in Hong Kong. The same is true of French senior civil servants at the time of French Black African colonies.

Q.: *I* might add that very often corruption fuels a complete redistribution system. It is a customary economic system which is not necessarily reprehensible.

Q.: *I* protest against this "ethno moral" relativism and I base my argument on the talk given by Alain Henry, in the seminar Social Life at the École de Paris², regarding the Cameroon tontine system. He explained that corruption is born out of a dilemma between two ethics : on the one hand, the ethic of important principles such as honesty or justice, and on the other hand, the ethic of loyalty to one's friends, one's family or even one's clan. The person is caught between two duties : that of respecting what we may call Kantian morality ; and the duty of loyalty to his friend, or even to the person who got him the job in the company in the first place. According to Alain Henry, the element which prevents the majority of African countries from taking off economically, is that too often this loyalty ethic prevails over the ethic of important principles. In Western countries, which have developed economically and socially, it is often the case that priority is given to the loyalty ethic and your examples demonstrate this. However, for the most part, the ethic of important principles prevails despite it all, and this ethic is upheld and guaranteed by numerous institutions. If we want Africa to have a future, we have to hope that these customary practices stop and are replaced by Kantian ethics !

Q.: What was particularly interesting in Alain Henry's talk, is that he showed how the tontine system acts as an antidote to this loyalty ethic. Bringing one's contribution periodically to the tontine is so sacred that if anything is missing then there are very severe punishments, and therefore participation in the tontine allows one to stand up to non-stop requests from friends such as « I would gladly give you what you want since you are my friend but I cannot do so since I have to keep this money for tomorrow's tontine meeting ». In our companies, I think that it would be more useful to create institutions which, based on the tontine model, force people to respect values which one wants to promote and which is a defence against the dangers of the loyalty ethic than to discuss virtuous principles and create ethical committees.

Q.: As far as the civil service is concerned, one can pinpoint certain encouraging signs of change. A few years ago in France in the government treasury office, there was still a department which specialised in corruption, and which organised transfers of money via Switzerland to the accounts of Arab sheiks or African dictators. This sort of department was abolished in France and similarly elsewhere, and there now exist international organisations to which one can refer such as the IMF, the UN, or the OECD which will certainly not abolish these sorts of practices instantly but will at least make them increasingly difficult to carry out.

People are not for sale

Q.: One of my students did his work experience in a large Parisian establishment where he discovered many cases of corruption. I asked him to analyse the exact extent of corruption in the company. He replied « it depends purely on the amount of money involved : below a certain price which I shall call A, no-one is for sale and it would be pointless in any case. Price B is the equivalent of the purchase price of an apartment : many people allow themselves to be tempted by the idea of no longer having to pay a rent. Finally, price C corresponds to a sum which means you would no longer have to work if you so desired. Nobody can be bought below A but there are very few people who can be bought above C. »

Q.: In the fight against corruption, the role of education seems essential to me. The whole problem comes down to ethics : « Can we put a price on a person ? Is a person a commodity ? » As far as I am concerned, the situation is very clear and I make a sharp distinction between a pile of gold on the one hand and a group of people on the other. The pile of gold will never produce anything by itself ; it is purely a means to an end. What animates human beings is what we are and what we represent. But of course things are not necessarily seen that clearly by everyone.

² Alain Henry, *Tontiniser l'économie* ?, Les Annales de l'École de Paris, vol X.

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A. A. : I was particularly struck by Mr. R's attitude when he refused his director's offer of profit-sharing by replying that he thought that he was being paid correctly and that he did not need any more money. This attitude is not unusual : in the newspapers, we can easily find advice on how to increase one's salary but few articles tell you what is an appropriate upper limit when asking for a rise. When I asked students at the *École Centrale* what they would have done in Mr. R's place, most of them said they would have accepted the salary increase, all the more so as it was not a cash payment, but a contract which was totally lawful.

Q.: The problem when one enters into a situation where money rules and dominates out all other considerations, is that one quickly finds oneself in an absurd situation where there is likely to be poor performance. I have seen companies where the way to the top of the ladder has become so perverse that far from being the most competent people who were the heads of departments, it was those who were the most adept at corruption ; or where any attempt at recruiting new blood into the company was systematically pushed aside; and where the auditors that I had commissioned to put the company back on its feet, cried off because the whole system was so rotten that they could not see how to make it any healthier.

I can only see one solution as a protection against these sorts of problems which is avoiding monoculture in companies at all costs ; and when it is a question of putting things in order, bringing together all the personnel from the lowest to the highest levels. In my experience of fighting against corruption, I have usually found more common sense among the blue-collar workers than the executives, the engineers and the supervisory management...

Leaving corruption, leaving a sect

Q.: What makes Mr. T's story an unusual example is the fact that he was able to rely on the hierarchy in order to resist corruption. In the three other cases, the management was either absent, or downright corrupt.

Q.: In one of his works, Alain Etchegoyen cites the case of a company where, if someone is faced with an ethical dilemma, there is a rule that he has to talk to a superior in the hierarchy, or to the ethics committee. It is a system which ought to encourage moral deliberations. We can liken this situation to that of people who are members of a sect. According to Michel Monroy³, the sine qua non for being able to get out of a sect is to create a strong relationship outside of the sect and to be able to talk to one's entourage about what you are experiencing. If this is not the case, people are caught up in such a friendship network, whether it be real or alleged, from which they are unable to escape.

The double injunction

Q.: *I* knew a person who worked in a civil engineering company. He was made to sign an ethics charter which effectively stipulated that in the case of compromise of principles in an affair of corruption, the employee would be made redundant immediately. However, it was difficult to get markets without corruption, and if an employee did not bring in a sufficient number of markets he would automatically be made redundant. This is the same situation as that of illegal drug-taking in cycling : it is illegal to take drugs and if one is caught, one is eliminated. However, if one does not take drugs, one does not win any races and one is also eliminated.

Exit, voice and loyalty

Q.: *I* do not think that the A* decisions which the different people took are very efficient from the point of view of building a better world. Between the three possibilities which Albert O. Hirschman suggests, they all chose the exit option. I would rather that they had fought together against corruption or set a trap to give the local prosecutor proof.

³ Michel Monroy, *La dérive sectaire*, Les Annales de l'École de Paris ; vol. VI.

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Q.: Of course, it would be desirable if everyone tried to fight corruption at his own level. One should not underestimate the courage necessary to choose the exit option. Most people need their salary in order to survive and losing their job is catastrophic. Therefore, the easiest and most tempting solution is not to leave, but to stay.

Presentation of the speaker :

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